This article explores three key arguments: Firstly, it seeks to demonstrate the contradictions and limits within Kantian hospitality, and its links to colonialism and practices of racialisation. The acclaimed universalism of Kant's law of hospitality forecloses a discussion of its dualism, and erases the historical, racist context in which it was conceived. The prioritisation of concept over conception allows Kant's theory on race to be obscured from official discourse and framing of policies while it still courses through inherited perceptions and theories. Secondly, in making my case, I will be applying the notion of coloniality, coined by Aníbal Quijano and later developed by Walter Mignolo, to the existing but small body of critical discourse on Kant and race.
Introduction
The European Union's response to the refugee crisis and the current political malaise of the so-called 'West' makes it imperative to (re)assess theories of hospitality and the complacency of cosmopolitanism. The rise of xenophobia, white supremacist extremism, far-right politicians in Europe and North America, and the apparently shock result of 'Brexit', have been portrayed as a worrying retreat from a previously taken-for-granted progressive trajectory in world politics. Indeed, Brexit (that is, the voluntary self-exclusion of the UK from an institution that prides itself on its soft power and attractiveness of membership) has produced something of a trauma in Britain and a state of shock amongst the UK's 'liberal' partners. Both the rise of nationalism and the refugee crisis have exposed a deep inhospitality in Europe that attack the very essence of a self-perceived cosmopolitan European identity. The close timings of these political developments have produced a sense of crisis in the EU project, as if we are witnessing a watershed in global politics where years of moral and political progress are now in retreat. Indeed, numerous commentators and politicians feared that the very principles of the Enlightenment now seemed to be at stake. However, is this in fact the case? Is the To understand those roots, one ought to return to early debates on hospitality. While the term itself has largely fallen out of favour in academic and policy discourse, Gideon Baker makes the 3 case for a deeper study of hospitality in International Relations, particularly given that the notion of the stranger and his/her rights has been so central to the discipline. Indeed it used to be at the fore 4 -front of concerns in world politics, as can be gleaned from the weight of thinking devoted to the stranger and the 'other' by the likes of Hobbes, Vattel, Vittoria, Pufendorf and not least Kant, who features most prominently as the acclaimed inspiration for contemporary cosmopolitans and theoretical analogies of the EU. 5 From a theory perspective, then, there is a sense among those working on hospitality, such as (among others) Baker, Cavallar, Niesen, Benhabib, Bulley, and their forerunner Derrida, that they are rejuvenating a forgotten legacy of international political theory that preceded theorising on cosmopolitanism. For them, its historical role in informing existing political norms, and its potential for shedding light on cosmopolitan tensions, should receive greater credit. Thus Baker calls for a renewed engagement with hospitality to 'retrieve' those early 'hotly contested' debates in international theory. It is this framing of hospitality that helps to reassert the notion that it has been a constitutive tradition in European epistemology, which in itself has significant implications for the way we view current trends in western politics.
This article, then, can be seen in part as a response to Baker's call. But given the illustrious list of thinkers on hospitality, why do we need a renewed focus on Immanuel Kant? In short, no other thinker on hospitality has received as much attention as has Kant, and arguably none has had the same level of influence on contemporary scholars. Of all the early theorists on hospitality, Kant is deemed to be pivotal for bringing hospitality out of the realm of pure ethics into politics, thus shifting hospitality from an absolute but impractical charity, to a practicable legal right. As Judith Still states, Kant 'produced a key reference point for cosmopolitan theories'. Georg Cavallar explains the 6 general consensus on the significance of Kant by stating, '[h] e is a climax and turning-point in the debate on natural law…Kant's cosmopolitan right is the last major contribution to international hospitality in this natural law tradition' -and, as he goes on to argue, it is natural law that forms the roots of contemporary human rights doctrines. Robert Post states: '[Kant] is one of our most useful 7 philosophical resources in regard to these difficult questions [on cosmopolitanism]'. 8 Moreover, unlike other modernist thinkers, it is Kant's cosmopolitan law that is most often applied to the context of present-day institutions. Despite more recent interventions on hospitality, most notably from Levinas and Derrida, it is Kant who remains the primary reference point for 9 cosmopolitan scholars. Derrida is a high critic of Kant, relying instead upon Levinas in his promotion of absolute hospitality. This shifts it into the realm of ethics, and further away from politics and legal philosophy. But for contemporary cosmopolitans, it is precisely Kant's attempt to bridge ethics with pragmatism that makes his work appealing and ever-relevant. Thus Benhabib cites Kant's stipulation against rejecting the one who might be in danger from destruction, as a direct forerunner to the Geneva Convention's prohibition against 'refoulement' (i.e. transferring an asylum seeker to a third country where they are likely to be under threat theory, and thus warrants renewed attention -I argue that the notion of coloniality provides a useful lens through which to do so, and a vehicle through which to apply those excavations to a contemporary context. My third aim is to explore the extent to which Kantian thought constitutes 'modern' cosmopolitanism, which upholds a selective approach to Kant's complete body of work. I seek to draw greater attention to the inadvertently complicit role of second-generation cosmopolitans in the erasure of race from the study of Kant. While EU policy is not the focal point of this article, I close by drawing parallels between the collective erasure of race and racism in academia and European practice towards refugees and immigrants.
Section one will explore the legal arguments for and contra cosmopolitan law, as debated by scholars of hospitality and cosmopolitanism, with specific focus on the arguments of Benhabib and Niesen. Section two will address coloniality and the racial logic at the heart of Kant's framework.
Section three will then return to cosmopolitan thinkers and European policies to demonstrate the continued legacy of Kantian racism through academic complicity. The lack of engagement with race and coloniality by cosmopolitan scholars is remarkable, validating the argument of decolonial scholars that limited temporal and spatial frameworks have facilitated this blindspot. Through its erasure, this racist logic is unwittingly transmitted by cosmopolitan scholars who uphold both Kantian principles and the efficacy of the EU as a vehicle.
Interrogating At first glance, these lofty principles also carry a more ominous possibility, in that they appear to erase colonialism from the debate, and simultaneously provide a justification for colonialism via the legalisation of unilateral property claims. If Kant's prioritisation of the state as a means to global peaceful relations, and his provisions for private law (entailing both appropriation and coercion) are universalised -as indeed he prescribes -then it would go further than Vitoria's carte blanche for absolute hospitality, in that he not only permits but advocates the appropriation of property and permanent residence of territory.
However, and crucially, Kant mitigates against this interpretation and application of his private law by introducing cosmopolitan law -that is, a universal hospitality that he marks out as distinct from domestic hospitality (though he himself does not use the latter term).
The key discussions of hospitality are to be found in Kant's Perpetual Peace and in the Doctrine of Right, as a means to complete Kant's formula for a global public law -the triumvirate of state law, international law and cosmopolitan law are described as the architecture needed for a global 'civil constitution'. Kant lays out a cluster of legal rights including the following: the right to 22 'present oneself for society' i.e. a basic communicative right; moreover this could reflect a range of purposes, from civil association, 'neighbourhood' or simply entertaining company. Alongside these are legal obligations: a duty to not prevent or hinder the expression of the above rights; and ensuring that the one expressing their right is not allowed to perish if they are turned away. The latter does not mean the host has no right to reject, but rather any rejection is conditional on the guest's safety of life. The first obligation also means the communication (the claim for hospitality) cannot be ignored, but must at least be acknowledged. The most significant prescription for hospitality to 'strangers' is 23 to be found in the following passage:
Hospitality means the right of the stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives on the land of the other. One may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may not treat him with hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one may demand. A special contract of beneficence would be needed in order to give an outsider a right to become a fellow inhabitant for a certain length of time. It is only a right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all men have. They have it by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally tolerate the presence of the other (Kant 1795).
Kant is clear that hospitality is not merely an expression of charity or faith, as it may have been practised in the pre-Enlightenment era, but a legal right which belongs to, seemingly, all human beings, insofar as they are viewed as potential participants in a future world global citizenship. Moreover,
24
Kant envisaged this hospitality as being practised between hosts and strangers hailing from different and diverging civic entities.
Benhabib does offer a strong endorsement of Kantian hospitality, which I will address in more depth later in the article. But it is necessary to first explore her criticism of Kant. Benhabib questions the limitations Kant places on hospitality: that is, that the host does have the right to turn away the guest, having received his/her claim and having assured against any danger to him/her as a result of this refusal. She uses Kant's principle of hospitality as the foundation for existing norms on refugee asylum, and in doing so seeks to identify ways in which the above limitation also contributes to a limited refugee/asylum system today. She is willing to concede, here, that it is Kant who limits the rights of refugees, not merely the lack of EU policy implementation.
She notes that the Kantian right to visit is enshrined by law, but the right to be a permanent visitor requires a special agreement, 'a contract of beneficence' between host and guest. She cites 25 various examples of this 'special privilege' already being offered to visitors in the early modern peri-
Ibid., 94.
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25 od, demonstrating the practical viability of this provision, such as pre-Revolutionary France which offered professional residency and property rights to certain visitors, and permanent asylum given to Jews throughout Northern Europe during the Inquisition. However, under Kant's laws, the shift from charity or tradition to a rights-based system produces a new 'juridical and moral ambivalence that affects discussion of the right of asylum and refuge to this day'. This is where it is more useful to 26 go back to Kant, rather than more recent critics such as Derrida, since Kant overtly seeks to move the discourse of hospitality out of the realm of pure ethics. His work seeks to address a practical conundrum and in turn produces practical questions. Thus, while there is a duty on the host to prevent a visitor from being endangered, what duty is there to go beyond this basic right, if any? There may be a duty to provide a right (temporary visit), but no duty to provide a privilege (permanent stay).
Moreover, if the duty is enforced by law, does this remove the need to offer protection based on a this lack of enforcement and such inherent ambiguities in Kant's own legal philosophy demonstrates the limitations to hospitality go beyond policy and are to be found at the intellectual level.
However, Niesen argues that this interrogation of Kantian hospitality is arguably underselling one of its most important functions. He acknowledges Benhabib's critique, that while these communicative rights are far-reaching, the limits seem 'overly restrictive at first'. He also agrees that, de 28 -spite its centrality, Kant's legal philosophy on hospitality and the extent to which the norm applies, European behaviour in the colonies -thus it cannot be forgotten that the law is constituted by that historical context within which Kant's hospitality was conceived. Given that is the case, it is notable that there is no mention of race in Kant's work on hospitality. Niesen does highlight Kant's anti-imperialism, but his detailed analysis also serves to emphasise the absence of any discussion of racial logics that prevailed at the time. In this section I will discuss the dual erasure and promulgation of racism within Kant's legal-political philosophy, geography and anthropology and situate it within Quijano's and Mignolo's frameworks of coloniality. In this way I seek to tie the work of philosophers of race more explicitly to decolonial studies.
One of the main reasons why Kant's cosmopolitan provincialism is overlooked is because he situates himself in an anti-imperialist camp, and in doing so gives the impression that he believes in 31 the rights of non-Europeans. Thus, why should his laws of hospitality not be expanded to non-Europeans?
What allows this assumption to prevail is the failure of contemporary scholars to distinguish between colonisation on the one hand, and racism as a preceding facilitating condition on the other. 32
For example, Kant's anti-imperialism is a condemnation of colonisation as a historical event that can be rectified by an ahistorical law. Such condemnation, however, does nothing to challenge the faulty premise that colonisation 'happens' because of need and greed (both rational reasons), with no men- tion of the philosophy which produces and incentivises this colonisation, and no mention of the geographical particularity of appropriation -a particularity that is based on race.
Thus for Kant, once colonisation is abolished as a practice, only then will Europeans exemplify true cosmopolitanism which might then usher in a perpetual peace; this is evident from Kant's view that 'a violation in one part of the world is felt everywhere' indicating that colonisation has However, Kant's condemnation of colonisation rather than racism foreclosed an interrogation of the latter; this foreclosure was even more emphatic once decolonisation produced a supposed 36 new present, a discontinuity that thus resolved the injustices of the past and further distanced Kantian concepts from their historical conception.
Here it is necessary to turn to Quijano's seminal work on coloniality, later built upon by
Mignolo. In Quijano's definition of the concept, he ties capitalism, racial hierarchies, and racist epis- temologies in a matrix of 'coloniality'. He argues this matrix was purposefully constructed, taught 37 as scientific fact and upheld as a normative belief in Europe and then the Americas. Quijano's matrix enables one to identify the more hidden facilitators of colonisation, these being: modernity; an economic system that enabled and even required the dispensing of human lives; and knowledge that helped to codify and justify racism through 'scientific fact'. This knowledge system involved, to give one example, the separation of mind from the body, the identification of humanness with the mind, and a subsequent hierarchy in which Europe came to be viewed as the locus of reason and thus humanity, while non-Europeans were viewed as mere bodies deficient of humanity. The function of this matrix was epitomised by the slave trade, first between the Americas and Europe, and then Africa. It is this knowledge system and matrix that imbues the conception of Kant's work, from which his concepts cannot be divorced.
Mignolo developed this to distinguish colonisation (the primary concern of postcolonialism, and a historical event redressed by decolonisation), from coloniality (the primary concern of decolonialists). Unlike the historical event of colonisation, coloniality relates to epistemologies, ways of thinking, and where one is doing that thinking. So Quijano argues that while the 'formal system of political domination by western European societies over others seems a question of the past' the specific colonial structure of power that enabled it is not. In his 2002 article, Mignolo goes on to artic 38 -ulate a key limitation with 'anti-colonialism', for it implies that colonisation preceded and produced coloniality, and assumes that with abolition of the former the latter would also dissolve. But in fact, 39 colonisation, along with modernity, was a derivative of coloniality. It was the matrix of coloniality that 'inspired' colonial activity. It is the activity that Kant condemned, but both conception (the knowledge system and its practices at the time) and concept (matrix of coloniality that upheld racism) remained unchallenged. analysed in isolation from each other. Consequently, 'to consider any narrowly defined topic within the scope of…Kant's race theory or his philosophy of biology, could lead to a reconsideration of every other part of the critical project', indeed a 'complete reassessment of his contribution to the "project of modernity"'. If considered in this light, it should lead to a major reconsideration of 49 Kant's take on hospitality.
To attempt this reconsideration, one has a whole host of racist statements in Kant's work to choose from. One such is worth highlighting here, as it neatly showcases the way in which Kant played a key role in codifying racial hierarchies in a burgeoning knowledge system, which in turn shaped his cosmopolitan telos:
In hot regions, people mature earlier in every sense, but do not reach the perfection of the temperate zones. Humanity is in its greatest perfection in the race of the whites.
Yellow Indians have somewhat less talent. Negroes are far lower, and at the bottom lies a portion of the American peoples. 50
By extension, and arguably the most notable of his racist proclamations is Kant's assertion that 'all races will be wiped out…except for the white'. No indication is given that this should even be pre South Americans, deemed by Kant to be the lowest of races, are excluded from his matrix altogether.
The erasure is not an oversight, it reflects Kant's ontology and directs his epistemology. 53 These are some brief examples that demonstrate the particularly insidious and damaging nature of Kantian racism. Unlike Voltaire, Kant's racial descriptions are not gratuitous insults that can be dismissed as mere prejudice -they are given an air of scientific objectivity, couched in apparent logic. It is worth remembering the fluidity of the discipline of geography in this period -Kant's work contributed to the shaping of the discipline and sedimentation of core ideas about the relationship between territory and race; his anthropology subsequently built on this to forge a connection between race and morality; and finally his legal-political work consciously zoomed in on the so-called highest standard of morality -that of the white race. As Mignolo argues, Kant utilised and tidied up the messy transformations in cartography at this time, while his theories worked in tandem with Adam
Smith's seminal works on capitalism, thereby shaping an interconnected matrix of coloniality. 54
Kant's complicity in the establishment of coloniality is significant.
! The Erasure of Race in Cosmopolitan Discourse

!
The previous section establishes the connection between Kant, racism and coloniality. In this section I argue that the erasure of race by political theorists and most notably critical Kantians, has helped to uphold the coloniality that Kant nurtured and contributed to; thus decolonial efforts directed towards Kant and modernist scholars should also address the underpinning coloniality in cosmopolitan literature.
Firstly, the ideological architecture that Kant's law of hospitality was conceived in does not receive sufficient attention in cosmopolitan literature. But more significantly, and more dangerously I she has done more to highlight limits to Kant's law of hospitality, while still upholding its core principles and seeking to apply it to the present. It is this simultaneous critique and endorsement of Kant that I think is important for my argument, while not necessarily discounting the role of other cosmopolitan scholars -my critique would equally apply to them. Moreover, Benhabib critiques both Derrida and Levinas for seeking to address hospitality purely in the ethical realm as an unconditional right, whereas she seeks to treat it as a concept that intersects the political and legal realms, precisely because she is concerned with its practical implications. This very framing creates a distinction be 61 -tween a discourse approach and a practical-legal approach, and effectively she is bracketing Kant in the latter.
As highlighted in the earlier section, she offers a nuanced critique of the loopholes and ambiguities in Kantian hospitality, particularly as she seeks to explore its utility in relation to the currentday plight of refugees. This application serves to upgrade Kantian hospitality, thus reinforcing its 62 place in contemporary reading and practice of hospitality. It is via this 'upgrading' that critical Kantians inadvertently help to transmit the embedded racial hierarchies within Kant's work. what are the delimitations of Kant's ontological foundations for hospitality? 2) What is the authority of enforcement? And 3) how does one resolve the tension that stems from demands of cosmopolitan justice and self-governance? She promises to address all three, but crucially in relation to the first question she states: 'my concern is less with the kind of ontological universe in which cosmopolitan norms can be said to exist, than with how these norms, whatever their ontological status, can shape, guide and constrain our political life' This short treatment of Kant's ontology is remarkable, and 63 arguably can only be dismissed by one who is not personally implicated by his ontology. That ontology is laid out not in Kant's legal-political writings, but of course in his geography and anthropology -as we now know, a racist ontology that paves the way for an imperialist epistemic.
My first example is illustrated in 'Another
! 20 Still, Derrida and Hospitality, 8. 60 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 157-9.
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Benhabib draws greater attention to the flaws in Kantian hospitality in The Rights of Others?
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Overlooking ontology means cosmopolitans accept reason as the necessary foundation for the application of Kantian hospitality, but will rarely ask what happens if any community is deemed to be deficient in their rational capacities. The universalism assumed of Kant's cosmopolitan law is rendered more ambiguous due to Kant's regular interventions to insist on reason as the precondition for all his laws -it does suggest that he considers there must be numerous circumstances when reason is absent.
Rarely is this, or its implications, explored by cosmopolitans. And yet it is a necessary backdrop to consider because no law exists in abstraction from its societal and historical context, which continues to constitute that law until a deliberate separation takes place. Moreover, while laws can be regulated, ways of thinking and perceiving cannot. Contestation on Kant's speculative anthropology is effectively foreclosed through silence on the matter in his later works, and thus his knowledgeconstructions are never undone. This process is inherited and sustained by critical Kantians today, who grapple with the practical, legal, national and normative impediments to modern-day cosmopolitanism, but remain virtually silent, wilfully so, on the ontological 'impediments' of racism.
Given that cosmopolitans claim to be concerned about contemporary global ethics and practice, and given that the majority of the world's current refugee population are non-white and non-European, the lack of attention to the existing coloniality that fosters blatant inhospitality towards them is unconscionable. Before dealing with the legal limitations of Kantian hospitality, it is not unreasonable that they ought to focus on dismantling the coloniality that underpins the entire framework. Erasure and silence in this context becomes complicity.
The second example of 'upgrading' and erasure can be found in Benhabib's critique of contemporary practices of hospitality. Her critique centres on the obstructionism of the state, chiefly its impediments to provisions of human rights law, the disharmony between positive law and natural law, and state-imposed exclusion of those who live within but still are excluded from the polity. 64 By tethering cosmopolitanism to democracy, she argues that cosmopolitan norms will eventually, and progressively, be absorbed within positive law via the will of the people, not dissimilar to the Wilsonian linkage between commerce, peace and domestic public opinion. Like Kant, she demonstrates a strong teleological approach, for she does not really demonstrate how these norms will be absorbed except through socio-economic means to mitigate the differentiation between ethnic groups -it is a materialist resolution rather than a conceptual-normative one. Her key conflict is with a nation based on ethnos, which contradicts her universalist ethical principles; thus she calls for an Nostrum' rescue operations saved around 100,000 lives of migrants and asylum seekers since it began. The stark logic of the EU's decision to terminate this operation is to allow many hundreds of (non-white) people to perish simply in order to deter other would-be migrants from attempting entry.
This not only contravenes Kant's stipulation that no traveller should be refused entry if their lives will be endangered; it contravenes the obligation of the host to at least acknowledge the traveller's claim for hospitality, even if the host reserves the right to reject it afterwards.
Its abolition and the resistance to refugee resettlement has not stopped people from making the hazardous journey, and the numbers of people drowning has only increased. To treat the thousands of migrant deaths at sea as ' accidents', as is often the case in political and media discourse, overlooks the political agency of the EU that enables this crisis to exist in the first place, but which also has the capacity to alter policy and possibly save thousands of lives. Instead, the migrants' existence, and their deaths, are erased from EU discourse and policy. One might ponder, is this really a violation of the Kantian hospitality it claims to uphold, or is it in fact a devastatingly accurate mirroring of his cosmopolitan law and its erasure of race? This is a question that cosmopolitan authors appear to be unequipped to answer because their framework is so deeply buried within a Kantian epistemology.
Cosmopolitans seek to bridge the tensions between sovereignty, ethnicity, democracy, and hospitality, to offer a more ethical, just solution to contemporary world problems. Whether acknowledged or not, they are bound to their Enlightenment heritage and turn to it frequently for inspiration.
But modernist thinkers cannot offer a way out of the deepest of injustices in contemporary world politics, for their ontologies and epistemologies are steeped in coloniality. If the quest for an ethical and practical hospitality is sincere, greater attention needs to be given to frameworks of hospitality outside of the imperialist architecture. The archives of decolonial conceptualisations of hospitality are ! 25 rich and substantial. Only by unbinding themselves from modernity, by engaging with alternative 70 thinkers and epistemes, as well as alternative historical practices beyond the EU, can cosmopolitan scholars move beyond the coloniality of Kantian hospitality.
!
Conclusion
!
Europe's failure to uphold a basic universalist reading of cosmopolitan law warrants renewed focus not just on EU refugee protection mechanisms, but on its purported Kantian roots. Europe's inhospitality is not (as has often been suggested in media and political commentary, chiefly by those who are in fact sympathetic to the plight of refugees) a new and sudden development; rather, as Quijano and Mignolo have argued via the notion of coloniality, it is a reflection of an imperialist epistemic that has shaped academic discourse, perception and practice towards non-European, non-white races.
This coloniality has been inherited by cosmopolitan theorists, or 'second-generation Kantians', who draw upon Kant's law of hospitality for their own ruminations on contemporary issues of asylum and refugees. Those that seek to 'upgrade' (rather than overturn) Kantian hospitality, such as Benhabib, do offer a critique of Kantian imitations on hospitality and the inherent ambiguity of his prescribed rights and obligations. But this critique reflects a 'problem-solving' approach set within the parameters of Kant's moral and teleological logic, to remedy and thereby preserve the relevance of Kantian hospitality.
Thus counter-arguments that seek to restore the critical potential in Kant's philosophy as a safeguard of non-European rights fails to look beyond the imperialist boundaries that his work is situated in. By provincialising and historicising Kant's legal framework, rather than treating it in abstraction from its historical and imperialist conception, one is able to restore the importance of race to Kant's 'system-building' theories. By excavating his works on geography and anthropology, it is possible to identify the constitutive effects of an erasure of race from Kant's legal-political theory on the one hand, and a simultaneous project of racist codification in Kant's natural history on the other.
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The primary emphasis might be on non-English speaking authors, but in addition a fruitful example of a The article mines those archives to consider the historical conception of European notions of hospitality, inverts the focus towards the non-European hosts, and offers an alternative reading of hospitality that breaks the modernist monopoly in its conceptualisation.
Rather than addressing this sizeable impediment in Kantian hospitality, cosmopolitan theorists have produced an upgraded Kantianism that continues to both obscure and reinforce his racist ontology and epistemology. While Kant's racism has been exposed by both decolonial theorists and philosophers of race, the same level of scrutiny has yet to be applied to cosmopolitan theorists and frameworks of hospitality. It is fitting therefore to conclude with a call for more decolonial scholarship on non-modernist epistemologies and practices of hospitality, which would challenge the eurocentric, cosmopolitan monopoly on the subject. 
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